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VOICE SPECTROGRAPHY EVIDENCE: APPROACHES TO
ADMISSIBILITY
Sharon E. Gregory*
The admissibility of the results of voiceprint' analysis as evi-
dence in a criminal trial has received a great deal of attention in
the last ten years, both from legal scholars2 and in the courts.3 Al-
though a relative newcomer to the field of forensic science,4 voice
spectrography is not a recent development in the field of evidence;
Wigmore foresaw the use of a voiceprint as early as 1937, when he
* Associate, McCarthy, Roader, Durrette & Davenport, P.C.; B.A., 1972, College of Wil-
liam & Mary; M.Ed., 1978, George Mason University; J.D., 1985, T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
1. Lawrence G. Kersta's research at Bell Telephone Laboratories in the 1940's led to his
creation of the voiceprint identification method. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EvI-
DENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES § 12.03 (2d ed. 1978). Kersta coined the term "voiceprint" for his
research. See Jones, Evidence vel non: The Non Sense of Voiceprint Identification, 62 Ky.
L.J. 301, 303 (1973-74); see also infra note 20.
In this article, the term "voiceprint" is used to mean the spectrographic prints of one's
voice for use in comparing such readings with the actual voice of the person involved, so as
to determine whether that person uttered certain words. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1411 (5th
ed. 1979).
2. A comprehensive listing of the many scientific reports and legal commentaries is found
in State v. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, - n. 5, 686 P.2d 1224, 1234 n.5 (1984).
3. United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982) (admissible); United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979) (admissible);
United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (inadmissible); United States v.
Baler, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975) (admissible); United
States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975) (admissible);
United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975) (admissible); United States v. Addi-
son, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (inadmissible); United States v. Williams, 443 F. Supp.
269 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (admissible); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
(admissible); Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224 (inadmissible); People v. Kelly, 17 Ca.
3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976) (admissible); People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d
69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974) (inadmissible); Cornett v. State, - Ind. -, 450 N.E.2d 498
(1983) (admissible); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (admissible); Reed v. State,
283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) (inadmissible); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191,
327 N.E.2d 671 (1975) (admissible); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977)
(inadmissible); State v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970) (inadmissible); People v. Col-
lins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1978) (inadmissible); State v. Williams, 4
Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983) (admissible); State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130,
336 N.E.2d 442 (1975) (admissible); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277
(1977) (inadmissible).
4. The first case in which spectrogram evidence was admitted was People v. Straehle, No.
9323/64 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County, N.Y. Apr. 1, 1966).
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suggested that the individuality of a person's voice provided a pos-
sible means of speaker identification.5
The results of voice spectrographic analysis may be used as a
prosecution tactic to establish 6 or corroborate7 identity, or as a de-
fense tactic to exculpate the accused.' Courts faced with voice
spectrography evidence have arrived at the decision to accept or
reject such evidence through a strict 9 or modified 0 application of
the Frye doctrine, 1 or by applying relevancy and reliability stan-
dards.12 Today, the trend in federal court is to accept the use of
voice spectrography evidence, while the trend in state court is to
reject such evidence. 3 Even among the states, decisions are split;
two recent state courts considering the admissibility of voice spec-
trography evidence reached opposite conclusions. 4
In view of the wealth of material describing the mechanics of
5. Vocal Traits. By means of a well-understood principle ... the vibrations of the spo-
ken voice on a diaphragm may be accurately translated . . . into oscillations of a
needle, and there oscillations may be arranged to leave a continuous variable ink-
tracing as a record .... [T]he spoken voice ... can now ... be made to leave a
. . . record having minute differences of individuality. ... If now it can be proved
that this individuality of the vocal organ ... endures. . ., it is obvious that an addi-
tional mode of identification ... has become practicable.
WIGMORE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDICIAL PROOF § 156, at 284-85 (3d ed. 1937), cited in Reed, 283
Md. at - n.1, 391 A.2d at 378 n.1.
6. State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 422, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (identity es-
tablished for purposes of probable cause to arrest).
7. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671.
8. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224 (evidence held inadmissible, but court indicated
that reconsideration in light of future development of the method would be appropriate).
9. See, e.g., Reed, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364.
10. See, e.g., Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671.
11. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding scientific evidence inad-
missible if it has not achieved general scientific acceptance); see infra notes 54-72.
The Frye case considered and rejected use of the polygraph; therefore, reliance on the
Frye test for the admissibility of other kinds of scientific evidence may be misplaced. There
are many problems with admitting polygraph evidence which do not arise in considering the
admissibility of voice spectrograph evidence. Chief among these problems is the fear that a
jury will give the polygraph conclusive weight; the polygraph, which purports to establish
honesty or credibility, thus usurps the very function of the jury. See also infra note 20. See
generally Comment, Voice Spectrogram Analysis: A Case of False Elimination, 1980 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 217, 227-28.
12. See, e.g., Franks, 511 F.2d 25; Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444.
13. Reed, 391 A.2d at 407 (Smith, J., dissenting). But see Note, Voiceprints in the Court-
room-Scientific and Evidentiary Problems, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1163, 1163 (1979) (suggesting
that identification of a trend is premature).
14. Compare Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224 (error to admit spectrographic com-
parisons as exculpatory evidence because of the lack of general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community) with Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (spectrographic voice
identification testimony and exhibits allowed).
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voice spectrography, 15 this article will discuss that topic only
briefly."' The article will focus on the various approaches taken by
courts in deciding whether to admit voiceprint evidence,17 and a
plan for admissibility will be proposed.18 Finally, the article will
predict the reception of voiceprint evidence in the Virginia
courts. 19
I. MECHANICS OF VOICE SPECTROGRAPHY
A. The Process
Speech spectrography is a technique which transforms acoustical
signals produced by the human voice into a visual representation.
The resulting visual representation is called a spectrogram.0 The
examiner listens to tapes of known voices and selects similar words
and phrases to compare. The selected words are cut from the tape
and placed around a drum on the spectrograph. As the spectro-
graph's drum rotates, a magnetic head scans the tape and records
15. See, e.g., Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708; A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra
note 1, §§ 12.04, 12.05; Kersta, Speaker Recognition and Identification by Voiceprints, 40
CONN. B.J. 586 (1966); Note, supra note 13, at 1164-67; 19 A. Jun. PROOF OF FACTS 423-54.
16. See infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 47-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 94-124 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 125-51 and accompanying text.
20. Siegel, Cross-Examination of a "Voiceprint" Expert: A Blueprint for Trial Lawyers,
12 CUM. L. BULL. 509, 510 (1976).
Voiceprints should not be confused with fingerprints. "'[V]oiceprint,' with its overtones
of 'fingerprint,' gives voice spectrographic identification an aura of absolute certainty and
accuracy which is neither justified by the facts nor claimed by experts in the field." United
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975); see also
Cornett v. State, - Ind. -_, -, 450 N.E.2d 498, 500 (1983) ("Courts and experts generally
avoid use of the term 'voiceprints' because it may potentially lead to an unwarranted associ-
ation with fingerprint evidence, which has repeatedly been shown to be undeniably accurate
in the identification of individuals.").
The court in State v. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224 (1984), noted that "speech
spectrograms are fundamentally different from fingerprints. Whereas the anatomical ridges
in the skin are topologically invariant and remain essentially unaltered throughout a per-
son's lifetime, repeated utterances of the same word by the same speaker are not acousti-
cally invariant and change markedly with age." Id. at - n.2, 686 P.2d at 1233 n.2.
Nor should an analogy be made between voiceprint and polygraph results:
Spectrography is qualitatively different from polygraph evidence. In spectrography,
the examiner merely compares spectrograms reflecting the purely physical character-
istics of a voice. In polygraph analysis, the examiner must go on, to extrapolate a
judgment of something not directly measured by the machine, i.e., the credibility of
the person examined .... [Ulnpredictable variables ... make the polygraph tech-
nique far more speculative than is spectrographic analysis.
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1199 n.9 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979) (citation omitted).
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different bands of frequencies;21 the spectrogram which results ap-
pears as a series of patterns on paper.22 A tridimensional plane is
formed, with time plotted on the vertical axis, and the intensity of
the voice displayed by the darkness or shading of the lines on the
horizontal axis.23 A formant, which varies in appearance according
to the sound recorded, is a group of close, high intensity frequen-
cies appearing on the spectrogram as a dark band.24
The expert examines two voice exemplars to determine whether
a match exists:2
5
An examiner will seek to compare the mean frequency of the for-
mants in one spectrogram with the mean frequency of the formants
in the second spectrogram .... A second factor considered and
compared is the actual widths of the formants. An examiner will also
compare the gaps and the types of verticle striations on lines. Lines
that are relatively far apart generally indicate a low-pitched voice;
lines that are relatively close together generally indicate a high-
pitched voice.26
The spectrogram examiner also compares dipthongs, or combina-
tions of vowels, which appear on the exemplar as sloping formants,
and duration or rate of speech .27 Finally, the examiner makes an
aural comparison.28
B. Theoretical Underpinnings
Voice identification through the use of sound spectrography is
premised on two principles. The first principle is that individuals
are anatomically unique, and the parts of the anatomy involved in
speaking create the peculiar sound of an individual's voice. The
second principle is that anatomic variations between individuals
result in differences when two speakers utter the same sound. It is
the differences between speakers which raises identification pos-
sibilities ("interspeaker variation").29 Second, individuals have dif-
21. Note, supra note 13, at 1166.
22. Cornett, 450 N.E.2d at 500.
23. Id.
24. Siegel, supra note 20, at 511.
25. See infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
26. Siegel, supra note 20, at 511.
27. Id.
28. Note, supra note 13, at 1167; see also infra note 119 and accompanying text.
29. Siegel, supra note 20, at 509-10.
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ferent, but stable, patterns in the way the vocal apparatus is used
in speaking, and these basic patterns are not affected by minor
variations ("intraspeaker variability") in a person's voice." Simply
stated, "[t]he validity of sound spectrography as a reliable identifi-
cation technique must. . . be based on the assumption that inter-
speaker variability is always greater than intraspeaker
variability. '3 1
Proponents of voice spectrography as a tool for identification ad-
vance, as support for the first principle, the uniqueness of a per-
son's voice, that each of us is born with a different and unique
combination of physical characteristics constituting the vocal
mechanism-the voice cavities (the throat, nose and mouth) and
the articulators (lips, teeth, tongue, soft palate, and jaw muscles).3 2 ,
This theory lacks precise scientific proof,3 but it is nonetheless the
basis from which any attempt at voice identification by the spec-
trographic method must flow. The premise is based on the remote-
ness of the possibility that any two persons would have the same
size and coupling of vocal cavities and dynamic use patterns of
their articulators. 4
The second principle, that a person's voice remains relatively
unchanged over time, gives rise to an even more fertile area of con-
troversy. Proponents of voice spectrography readily admit that in-
traspeaker variability, caused by a number of factors, can indeed
"change" a person's voice. Intraspeaker variability may result from
30. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAu, supra note 1, ] 12.J04; Comment, supra note 11, at 219;
Note, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Voice Spectrography, 17 AKRON L. REV. 701, 701
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence]; Note, supra note
13, at 1164.
Further assumptions are that the spectrographic machine accurately reflects and displays
the uniqueness of a human voice, and that the examiner can accurately identify a voice on
the basis of subjective comparisons of spectrograms. Note, supra note 13, at 1164.
31. Siegel, supra note 20, at 510.
32. A. MOENSSENS & F. IaNAU, supra note 1, § 12.04.
33. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule,
25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 557 (1984).
Professor Moenssens notes that
[t]he theory of voice uniqueness, however, which the scientific community should
have subjected to a searching ... inquiry, never has been proven by empirical evi-
dence. As long as the theory remains a postulate, and not a proven fact, the technique
of comparing voice spectrograms cannot establish the identity of a speaker with any
relative degree of certainty.
Id.; see also Note, supra note 13, at 1164-66.
34. A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, supra note 1, § 12.04; Note, supra note 13, at 1166.
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purposefully changing or disguising one's voice, 35 as well as from
the effects brought on by a common cold, fatigue, stress, mood,
allergies, medication, intoxicants, dental work,38 aging37 and, in the
extreme case, surgery to any part of the vocal mechanism. 8 Propo-
nents of the spectrographic identification method hypothesize that
intraspeaker variability, however, is less than interspeaker variabil-
ity; therefore, the existence of intraspeaker variations does not
make identification of an unknown speaker unreliable.39
The constancy of the voice, according to one expert, is grounded
on the energy emitted during speech. Speech energy occurs on two
levels-a conscious level, where a person may attempt to alter his
voice, and a secondary level, over which a person has no conscious
control. "[The secondary level] is not really relevant to the speech,
and because [the speaker] doesn't really bother about controlling
that, it always turns out that [the secondary level] remains very
constant, even though he tries to change his voice to make it differ-
ent. '' 40 The underlying premise is that regardless of how a person
may attempt to disguise his voice, the aural and vocal mechanisms
with which he is born make it virtually impossible for him to suc-
cessfully disguise his voice.
The underlying theories of voice uniqueness and the relative sta-
bility of an individual's vocal pattern have been tacitly accepted by
courts for many years. The testimony of a lay witness identifying a
person by having heard his voice is regarded as legitimate and
35. Siegel, supra note 20, at 522-24; see also People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal.
Rptr. 708 (1974) (possibility of mimicry rendered voice spectrography evidence
inadmissible).
36. State v. Gortarez, 141 Ariz. 254, -, 686 P.2d 1224, 1235 (1984).
37. Siegel, supra note 20, at 533-34.
38. Comment, supra note 11, at 224. Dr. Oscar Tosi, a leading researcher and practitioner
in the field of voice spectrography, has opined that oral and nasal surgery or deliberate
changes in speech might increase the possibility of falsely eliminating a suspected person as
the one who produced a certain sample; but such changes would not increase the chances of
a false identification. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, -, 391 A.2d 364, 414 (1978).
39. Kersta, supra note 15, at 591. But see Comment, supra note 11, at 219 ("The exis-
tence of intraspeaker variability seems to cast doubt on the accuracy of spectrogram analy-
sis as a fact-finding device and confuses its admissibility.").
40. Reed, 283 Md. at -, 391 A.2d at 416. The expert who testified in the trial was Dr.
Leendert Peter Christian Jensen, a South African physicist and electrical engineer. Dr. Jen-
sen's observations were based on his own studies. He concluded that speech must be ex-
amined in the context of comparing bold black lines on the spectrogram with their attend-




competent evidence for the purpose of establishing identity.41 Sim-
ilarly, identification evidence of fingerprints and blood samples is
predicated on anatomical uniqueness.42
These theories and concerns have been focal points of several
notable studies conducted in efforts to buttress 43 or disparage44
voice spectrography. In a study requested by the National Acad-
emy of Sciences, the National Research Council assembled a mul-
tidisciplinary group of scientists which concluded that it could not
determine whether voice spectrography was a "fully developed
technology based solidly on science. ' '45 The committee reported,
"At the present time, the technique of voice identification is a
practical methodology that is rather widely used, but that lacks a
solid theoretical basis of answers to scientific questions concerning
the foundations of voice identification. '46 Until new surveys by
equally impartial groups are undertaken and published, it would
appear that the lack of bases for the theoretical underpinnings of
voice spectrography is the main impediment to its acceptance as a
forensic method of identification.
II. JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO ADMISSIBILITY
As various courts have wrestled with the question of whether to
admit voiceprint evidence, several approaches have emerged. A
41. Comment, supra note 11, at 221. In United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 545 F.2d 785
(2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held identification testimony by an interpreter who had never directly conversed with the
defendant, based on the interpreter's comparison of an unidentified voice on a tape with
tapes of the voice of the defendant. The court noted that the argument that the witness and
the defendant had never met went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Id.
at 792.
42. Comment, supra note 11, at 220-21. The use of blood-typing evidence is statistical,
since individual uniqueness of blood is almost impossible to show. "[S]ince voice spectro-
grams can vary within the samples of one individual," according to one view, "the evidence
is at the least a very specific grouping identification." Id. at 221 n.22.
43. Kersta, Voiceprint Identification, 196 NATURE 1253 (1962). For a summary of the
scientific debate, see Note, supra note 13, at 1168-73.
44. Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pichett & Stevens, Speaker Identification by Speech
Spectrograms: A Scientist's View of Its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AcousT. Soc'Y
Am. 597 (1970); Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Redroy, Nichol & Nash, Experiment in Voice Iden-
tification, 51 J. AcousT. Soc'v Am. 2030 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Experiment in Voice
Identification]. Although Dr. Tosi originally criticized Kersta's work, he later became an
advocate of the voice spectrographic method. See Moenssens, supra note 33, at 549.
45. Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms, National Research Council, On the
Theory and Practice of Voice Identification 12 (1979).
46. Id. at 10-12.
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number of courts have applied the Frye4" test of admissibility of a
novel scientific technique, or a variant of that standard, in deter-
mining whether to admit voice spectrography evidence.48 Federal
courts have required that the novel scientific technique be shown
to be relevant and reliable. 49 At least one state court has adopted a
case-by-case flexible standard derived from that state's rules of
evidence.50
Courts following the Frye test of admissibility, or a modification
of Frye, have been uncertain as to whether their role is to deter-
mine if general acceptance exists, or whether it is the court's duty
to determine the reliability of the method.5 1 There is also some
confusion as to whether voice spectrography evidence, as it is
presented in court, is a scientific method or merely an opinion by
an expert.52 The confusion is further compounded by the fact that
"[c]ourts experience difficulty determining whether the underlying
principle, the instrument that measures certain data, or a tech-
nique devised to evaluate the data requires general acceptance. '53
A. The Frye Test and Its Modification
The Frye test did not gain immediate judicial approval when the
decision was rendered in 1923.5" However, its popularity as a legal
test for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence spread, and
Frye is now cited in almost every criminal case considering the ad-
missibility of novel scientific evidence. 5
In order to admit voice identification evidence based on compar-
isons of spectrograms, courts have found it necessary to deviate
47. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see, e.g., Reed v. State, 283 Md.
374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978).
48. E.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975). The court in Franks noted, however, that it deemed "general acceptance as being
nearly synonymous with reliability." Id. at 33 n.12.
49. Note, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, supra note 30, at 704.
50. E.g., State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983). The Supreme Court
of Iowa adopted this approach when considering another kind of novel scientific evidence,
blood flight patterns. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980).
51. Siegel, supra note 20, at 541. (discussing Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327
N.E.2d 671 (1975)).
52. Siegel, supra note 20, at 529 (discussing Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364
(1978)).
53. Moenssens, supra note 33, at 555.




from" the Frye test.56 Since the scientific community in general was
unfamiliar with voice spectrography,57 Frye's requirement of gen-
eral acceptance posed an insurmountable impediment to the ad-
missibility of voiceprint evidence. The test was reformulated so
that "the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is
satisfied . . . if the principle is generally accepted by those who
would be expected to be familiar with its use. '58
A distinction should be drawn, however, between limiting the
field of experts for purposes of admissibility of the evidence and
for purposes of testimony at trial:
If the scientific field is expanded, .. contradictory evidence of reli-
ability will presumably be more available. But, if no experts who are
or would be expected to be familiar with a process dispute the valid-
ity or reliability of the process, it is overly cautious for the court to
exclude the evidence because it fears that the field, so limited, may
be biased. To guard against uniformly biased testimony at trial, the
field of experts for admissibility need not equal the field for testi-
mony. In other words, a court should decide the threshold question
of admissibility based upon testimony from experts most qualified
to evaluate the validity of the technique, those who are or would be
expected to be familiar with the technique. Then at trial, expert tes-
timony from someone whose expertise makes him capable of under-
standing the technique ... [w]ould be admitted to attack the relia-
bility of the evidence.5 9
If the field of relevant scientists is narrowed to those scientists
genuinely familiar with voice spectrography, then voiceprint evi-
dence-may be admissible. According to Dr. Tosi, "there is general
acceptance of this technique among the scientists actually working
in the field or genuinely familiar with the field."6"
However, in 1976 and thereafter, courts began to question
whether a single witness, whose career was built around voice spec-
56. Note, Admissibility of Spectrographic Voice Identification in the State Courts, 70 J.
CRiM. L. & CmIMINOLOGY 349, 351 (1979).
57. Moenssens, supra note 33, at 549 (indicating that the scientific field consisted of only
"the professor of audiology who embraced the voiceprint after initially spurning it and the
electrical engineer who first coined the term 'voiceprint' ").
58. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, -, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677; see also People v. Williams, 164 Cal.
App. 2d 858, 861-62, 331 P.2d 251, 254 (1958) (salline test admissible because it had been
"generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use").
59. Comment, supra note 11, at 230.
60. Reed, 283 Md. at -, 391 A.2d at 414 (Smith, J., dissenting); Comment, supra note
11, at 231.
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trography, "may be too closely identified with the endorsement of
voiceprint analysis to assess fairly and impartially the nature and
extent of any opposing scientific views." '61 Some jurisdictions re-
treated from the loosening of the Frye standard, and instead de-
manded strict compliance with the Frye test for admission of novel
scientific evidence. 2 This shift led to a judicial determination of
what comprises the "particular field"6 3 of voice spectrography.
6 4
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in State v. Reed, 5 decided that
such a field was comprised of "those whose scientific background
and training are sufficient to allow them to comprehend and un-
derstand the process and form a judgment about it."' 66 The court
disapproved the trial court's restriction of the field of relevant ex-
perts to those who are knowledgeable and work directly with the
technique.67 The Arizona Supreme Court noted, in State v.
Gortarez, 6 that an appropriate field of disinterested experts would
possibly include acoustical engineers, communications electronists,
linguists, phoneticians, physicists and speech communications ex-
perts. 9 The Indiana Supreme Court would include experts in the
fields of linguistics, psychology and engineering, ip addition to
those people who use voice spectrography for identification
purposes."0
Although delineation of the field and acceptance of the witness
as an expert are pivotal concerns, the inquiry under Frye does not
end there. General acceptance within the scientific community
must be demonstrated. In Commonwealth v. Topa,7 1 the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court recognized a Michigan state trooper as an
expert and praised his credentials in voice spectrography, but de-
clined to recognize the reliability of the process of voice spec-
trography. The court concluded that one officer's testimony was in-
sufficient to establish general acceptance by scientists active in the
61. People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 38, 549 P.2d 1240, 1249, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 153 (1976);
Moenssens, supra note 33, at 550.
62. E.g., Reed, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364.
63. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
64. Moenssens, supra note 33, at 548 (noting that voice spectrography is an area where
courts sometimes have difficulty with this step of the analysis).
65. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364.
66. Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 368.
67. Id. at -, 391 A.2d at 377.
68. 141 Ariz. 254, 686 P.2d 1224 (1984).
69. Id. at -, 686 P.2d at 1233.
70. Cornett v. State, __ Ind. -, -, 450 N.E.2d 498, 503 (1983).
71. 471 Pa. 223, 369 A.2d 1277 (1977).
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field to which the evidence belongs. 72
B. Relevance and Reliability Standards
In considering the admissibility of voiceprint evidence, federal
courts generally have limited the field of scientists to those who
would be expected to be familiar with voice spectrography, and
have focused on the reliability of the method rather than its gen-
eral acceptance. 73 This approach is echoed in Dean McCormick's
view that "[a]ny relevant conclusions which are supported by a
qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other
reasons for exclusion."74 Disagreement among experts as to the re-
liability or general acceptance of the method becomes an issue for
the jury to weigh.75
Noting that scientific evidence need not be infallible to be relia-
ble,76 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held, in United States
v. Williams,7 7 that "[t]he sole question is whether spectrographic
analysis has reached a level of reliability sufficient to warrant its
use in the courtroom. T7  The court identified as indicators of relia-
72. Id. at -, 369 A.2d at 1281.
73. E.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1117 (1979); United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975); accord State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980) (blood pattern evidence), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 927 (1981).
Dean McCormick offers support for this approach: "'[g]eneral scientific acceptance' is a
proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203
(E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
74. C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 73, § 203, at 491 (citation omitted). In adopting a "relevant
and reliable" test for admissibility of spectrographic evidence, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals noted that given the considerable discretion on the part of the trial judge to admit
or exclude such evidence, "[i]f a scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently accurate, courts
may also deem it 'generally accepted."' United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
75. An oft-cited example of allowing the jury to resolve the reliability or general accept-
ance issue is Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal dismissed,
243 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). In Coppolino, the defendant
was charged with injecting his wife with a drug for which the medical profession believed
there was no method for detection in a corpse. The state toxicologist developed a method of
detection specifically for that case; the evidence was admitted, along with the conflicting
testimony of each party's experts regarding the reliability of the method.
76. See also Moenssens, supra note 33, at 566.
77. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
78. Id. at 1198. The court declined to follow the Frye test, noting that "[tihere. is no
clearly defined, universal, litmus test for the general admissibility of all 'scientific' evi-
dence." Id. at 1197; see also Moenssens, supra note 33, at 565-66 ("The belief that the
application of a single, mechanistic test such as the Frye rule can determine the difficult
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bility the low potential rate of error, 9 the existence and mainte-
nance of standards,80 the absence of abuse of the technique,8 ' the
analogous relationship of voice spectrography with other similar
scientific techniques, 8 2 the presence of "failsafe" characteristics,
8 3
and the adversarial system itself which allows the indicators of re-
liability to be attacked at trial.84
The relevancy prong of the analysis of the admission of evidence
deriving from novel scientific techniques is grounded in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony. Rule 702 pro-
vides that a witness who qualifies as an expert may testify "[i]f
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in is-
sue."85 Further, Rule 901(b)(5) specifically provides for the identi-
fication of any voice by any person who can "connect" the voice
with the alleged speaker by any method of "hearing" the voice.88 It
has therefore been suggested that testimony by an expert witness
who has identified a voice by the voiceprint technique is also ad-
missible.8 7 However, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or an
analogous state rule, the expert testimony will not be admitted un-
less it is relevant. "For scientific evidence to be relevant, there
must be 'some demonstration that it is sufficiently reliable to make
the existence or nonexistence of a fact more probable than without
the evidence.' ",ss
issue of reliability in every case is [an] example of the scientific illiteracy that hampers
courts.").
79. In the most comprensive study of spectrography made to date, involving experiments
at Michigan State University with voices recorded directly and over the telephone,
with and without background noise, with words spoken in context and in isolation,
and with recordings made contemporaneously and at different times, Dr. Tosi arrived
at a false identification rate of 6.3%, a rate reduced to 2.4% when doubtful compari-
sons were eliminated.
Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (citations omitted).
80. "The International Association of Voice Identification, an organization concerned
with training and certification of spectrograph examiners and with procedures, requires that
ten matches be found before a positive identification can be made." Id.
81. The examiner who testified claimed positive identifications in 8% of 200 cases and
reported an inability to reach a decision in 76% of the cases. Id. at 1199.
82. The court cited as examples handwriting exemplars and gun barrel striations. Id.
83. "[I]naccuracies in the spectrograms, or failure to accurately reflect the voice of the
accused, is more likely to redound to [the defendant's] benefit than to his detriment." Id.
84. Id.
85. FED. R. EVID. 702
86. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5).
87. 5 WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE 901(b)(5)[01] (1978) (cited in Comment, supra note 11, at
232-33 n.73).
88. Note, Voice Identification Testimony Based on Spectrographic Analysis Inadmissi-
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Chief among the state courts which have opted for a relevance
and reliability test for admission of voiceprint evidence is the Ohio
Supreme Court. In State v. Williams, 89 the defendant pushed his
way into his victim's home and called for an ambulance to be sent
to a fictitious address. The telephone conversation was routinely
recorded by the ambulance service and was later compared to a
series of recordings made of the defendant's voice after his arrest.
The positive identification of his voice led to the defendant's con-
viction. On appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the Frye test
for admissibility of scientific evidence. Instead, the court endorsed
a more flexible standard derived from its own rules of evidence.
The court cited with approval a Maine case wherein that court re-
fused to adopt a special rule for scientific evidence, preferring to
follow the fundamental philosophy of the state rules favoring ad-
missibility of scientific evidence "whenever it is relevant and can
be of assistance to the trier of fact."90 In refusing to engage in "sci-
entific nose-counting for the purpose of deciding whether evidence
based on newly-ascertained or applied scientific principles is ad-
missible,"9 1 the Ohio court left the admissibility of expert testi-
mony to the discretion of the state's judiciary, to be decided on a
case-by-case basis.2 Admissibility would therefore depend upon
whether such testimony is relevant and would assist the trier of
fact, as required by the Ohio Rules of Evidence.9
ble Because the Technique Has not Gained General Acceptance in the Scientific Commu-
nity, Reed v. State, 39 MD. L. REv. 629, 637 (1980). Professor Moenssens cautions that a
loosely structured relevancy test could result in the admission of scientific evidence which
has not been shown to be reliable, because it would satisfy the "more or less" probable test
of Rule 401. Moenssens, supra note 33, at 563 n.71.
89. 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 Nl.E.2d 444 (1983).
90. Id. at _ 446 N.E.2d at 447 (citing State v. Williams, 388 A:2d 500, 503 (Me. 1978).
91. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
92. See also Hall, 297 N.W.2d at 85 ("[d]etermination of admissibility of [novel scientific]
evidence must necessarily be made on an ad hoc basis" [citation omitted]); Moenssens,
supra note 33, at 565 (a new procedure for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence
"must be sufficiently flexible to permit the court to determine admissibility on an ad hoc
basis").
On the other hand, the case-by-case approach was specifically rejected by the Maryland
Court of Appeals in Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). The court applied the
Frye rule to voice spectrography evidence and found such evidence inadmissible, insisting
that "considerations of uniformity and consistency of decision-making require that a legal
standard or test be articulated by which the reliability of a process may be established." Id.
at -, 391 A.2d at 368.
93. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at _, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
3691986]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:357
C. A Model for Admissibility
A model for the admission of voiceprint evidence, with accompa-
nying safeguards, can be derived from the Ohio court's discussion
and holding. The threshold requirement is, of course, that the
court apply either a flexible standard based on evidentiary rules
governing expert testimony or a modified version of the Frye stan-
dard, by which voice spectrography would be admissible if it is ac-
cepted as reliable by experts in the field of voice identification. 4
Second, there must be some testimony regarding reliability 5 in
the form of the history and mechanics of voice identification. 6 The
prosecution in State v. Williams97 established the reliability of
voice spectrography through the testimony of the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the International Organization of Voice Iden-
tification, which certifies all qualified voice analysts. This witness
testified that "a body of scientists, technicians and technologists
has developed since World War II in the field of voice identifica-
tion, that an international organization devoted to establishing
standards of certification has been established, and that within
this community of scientists, the reliability of voice identification
is without dispute."9 8 However, courts have not agreed upon the
degree of reliability which must be demonstrated. The Iowa Su-
preme Court has suggested that where a party seeks to admit novel
94. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
95. Professor Moenssens, in advocating a new procedure for admissibility of novel scien-
tific evidence which "emphasize[s] reliability of the technique rather than its general ac-
ceptance," notes that
It]he paramount function of an admissibility procedure is to ensure that admissible
novel expert testimony is reliable and that unreliable evidence is excluded. This func-
tion is entirely consistent with the general rules of relevancy, which limit the admis-
sion of evidence to information that will aid the trier of fact in properly determining
the issues.
Moenssens, supra note 33, at 565.
On the other hand, the Maryland Court of Appeals has maintained
[t]he question of the reliability of a scientific technique or process is unlike the ques-
tion, for example, of the helpfulness of particular expert testimony to the trier of
facts in a specific case. The answer to the question about the reliability of a scientific
technique or process does not vary according to the circumstances of each case. It is
therefore inappropriate to view this threshold question of reliability as a matter
within each trial judge's individual discretion.
Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, -, 391 A.2d 364, 367 (1978).
96. The need for this step will be obviated as the reliability of voice spectrography, or its
general acceptance, becomes a judicially noticed fact. See MCCORMICK, supra note 73.
97. 4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
98. Id. at -, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
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scientific evidence which hinges upon an examiner's analysis, a
"strong showing" of reliability is necessary.9 9 In a case involving
the admissibility of microscopic hair analysis, the Oregon Court of
Appeals concluded that "the only foundation required where the
technique has not been accepted . . . is that there be credible evi-
dence on which the trial judge may make the initial determination
that the technique is reasonably reliable."100 The opposing party
may rebut the reliability testimony through its own experts. 101
"[R]efutation evidence or evidence of disagreement in the scien-
tific community regarding the reliability of the process bears on
the weight, not the admissibility, of that evidence.
'10 2
Once the technique is recognized as reliable, the analyst must be
qualified as an expert by the laying of a proper evidentiary founda-
tion.10 3 In giving his opinion, the analyst makes one of five deter-
minations: an absolute identification, an absolute elimination, a
probable identification, a probable elimination, or no decision.104
The Ohio Supreme Court noted with approval that the trial
court allowed the introduction of the original tapes and "the play-
ing of the tapes for the jury, so they could hear for themselves the
voice(s) at issue. 1 0 5 Such a practice is simply a reflection of what
spectrographic experts customarily incorporate into the identifica-
tion process.10 6
Probably the most effective safeguard governing the use of voice
spectrographic evidence lies in proper and thorough cross-exami-
nation of the expert witness.10 7 An attack may be made on the ex-
tent of the studies or experiments in the spectrographic identifica-
99. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 86 (Iowa 1980).
100. State v. Kersting, 50 Or. App. 461, -. , 623 P.2d 1095, 1101 (1981) (emphasis added).
101. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
102. Kersting, 50 Or. App. at - 623 P.2d at 1099 (citation omitted).
103. Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, supra note 30, at 705.
104. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 446; see also supra note 81. Although a
false elimination-a failure to identify-would not adversely affect an accused, it is impor-
tant to note that if the method falsely eliminates a large number of persons, the spectro-
gram will diminish in value as an exculpatory device. Comment, supra note 11, at 223.
105. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at -, 446 N.E.2d at 448-49. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals also approved the playing of the tapes for the jury. United States v. Baler, 519
F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
The prosecution adopted a similar procedural safeguard in Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367
Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975). Eight witnesses listened to a recorded telephone call in
court; six of them identified the voice as that of the defendant.
106. See Note, supra note 13, at 1167; see also infra note 121 and accompanying text.
107. See generally Siegel, supra note 20.
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tion method, 08 as well as on the empirical methods employed.'0 9
Although Dr. Tosi, a leading figure in the field, has claimed that
the error rate in an empirical setting can be reduced to a negligible
amount in actual practice, no empirical evidence supports his
assertions." 0
In addition to questioning the expert regarding the validity of
empirical studies, the spectrographic analysis may be attacked by
questioning the examiner concerning the number of samples he
had for comparison in the particular case. The Tosi study indicates
that there is an increase in identification error when there are nu-
merous spectrograms of known voices to be compared with an un-
known voice."'
Other areas of investigation by cross-examination are distortions
in the particular telephonic transmission and background noise," 2
the possibility of mimicry or disguise,"13 and the emotional state of
the speaker.11 4
Counsel opposing the use of voice spectrographic analysis must
realize that
[w]hen two different speakers utter the same sound, the spectro-
grams for these utterances are remarkably similar in appearance in
spite of the fact that different speakers were involved. The reason
for this striking similarity is that a spectrogram emphasizes the in-
formation that characterizes the message (i.e., the words that the
speaker has uttered) and does not emphasize the distinctive charac-
teristics of the speakers.""
To combat the possible prejudicial effect of two spectrograms of
108. One leading study of voice spectrogaphy was conducted by Dr. Oscar Tosi in 1971 at
Michigan State University through a grant by the United States Department of Justice. The
method of recording, the phonetic context, the number of "known" speakers, the interval of
time, and the examiners' awareness of the speaker's presence in the pool of possibilities were
tested variables. Id. at 518-19.
109. In Dr. Tosi's 1971 experiment, all the subjects were native speakers of American
English, approximately the same age, with no speech disabilities. A group of examiners was
chosen and given one month of training in voice identification using the spectrographic
method. Id. at 518.
110. Id. at 521.
111. Id. at 524.
112. Id. at 526.
113. Id. at 522-24. In People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974), the
voice spectrographic analysis was not admitted because of the possibility of mimicry.
114. Siegel, supra note 20, at 525-26.
115. Id. at 528 (emphasis in original).
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the same spoken words, the attorney opposing the spectrographic
analysis might request that the spectrograms be kept from the
sight of the jury. Having spectrograms made of the voices of two
different people uttering the same word is another alternative." 6
The subjectivity of voice identification offers yet another area
for cross-examination. 117 Each examiner, in a sense, follows his own
processes and sets his own criteria."18 Authorities differ as to the
number of points of similarity necessary between the exemplars
before concluding that there is a match, but generally ten to
twenty comparable points indicate a match. 19 The aural compari-
son of voice exemplars that comprises a part of the spectrographic
analysis relies on the questionable premise that the ears are always
reliable. 120
An instruction to the jury concerning the weight to be given to
the spectrographic evidence presents yet another opportunity to
safeguard the use of the evidence. "[T]he jury remains at liberty to
reject voice identification evidence for any number of reasons, in-
cluding a view that the spectrographic voice identification tech-
nique itself is either unreliable or misleading.' 12 1
Outside the procedural safeguards122 at trial, the spectrographic
evidence may be excluded, under most state rules of evidence, on
grounds that its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value or
that the evidence would confuse or mislead the jury. 23 It has been
suggested that
[i]f the only evidence available concerning the identity of a speaker
is a spectrogram, and if the crime alleged consists entirely in the
speaking itself, the court should exclude the evidence, since the
116. Id. at 529.
117. See text accompanying notes 25-28 & 121.
118. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 79, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
119. Note, supra note 13, at 1167.
120. Siegel, supra note 20, at 531. Dr. Tosi stated that listening to the voice exemplars is
necessary, although he failed to offer evidence or data concerning how listening improved
the reliability of the analysis. Id.
121. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d at _, 446 N.E.2d at 448. The jury instruction was given in
general terms of weight to be given to the testimony of experts, taking into consideration
the expert's skill, experience, knowledge, veracity and familiarity with the facts of the case.
Id. at - n.7, 446 N.E.2d at 448 n.7. The jury instruction in Bailer, 519 F.2d at 467 was
phrased explicitly in terms of voice spectrography.
122. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, also outlined procedural safeguards; see supra notes 86-88 and
accompanying text.
123. FED. R. EVID. 403.
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spectrogram would be the only evidence presented and would point
conclusively to guilt or innocence in that case. Such a case would
make the spectrogram more than a tool for identification, since the
case would turn on that alone. 124
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF VOICEPRINT EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA
The use of scientific evidence in the courts of Virginia can be
found as early as 1879, when the court in Dean v. Common-
wealth125 allowed a comparison of firearms to determine if the
balls fired from them were similar in size to the slug found in the
victim's body. Today, the use of scientific evidence and accompa-
nying expert testimony in the courts of Virginia has "reached a
significant level. . . .In fact, Virginia trial courts have displayed a
willingness to explore the uses of certain investigative techniques
not generally recognized elsewhere. ' '126
Indeed, voiceprint evidence was admitted in an obscene tele-
phone call prosecution in Hanover County in 1977.127 Expert wit-
nesses for the prosecution were Dr. Oscar Tosi 12 and Fred Lund-
gren. 1 9 The defendant's challenges to Dr. Tosi's credentials and
the reliability of the voiceprint method were unsuccessful. 13 0 The
voiceprint evidence was corroborative in nature with other evi-
dence, including the victim's identification of the defendant's voice
in a voice line-up.' 31 The defendant in Saunders did not appeal his
conviction, however, and the absence of a trial record makes the
case of little guidance to the use of voice spectrography in Virginia
trial courts. The Virginia Supreme Court has not yet considered
124. Comment, supra note 11, at 234.
125. 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 912 (1879).
126. C. FRIEND, LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA § 172 (2d ed. 1983). One of the best exam-
ples of Virginia's willingness to admit novel evidence is Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va.
214, 294 S.E.2d 882 (1982). In Epperly, the court allowed dog tracking evidence after the
laying of a proper foundation of both the handler's qualifications and the dog's training and
abilities. Objections as to the track's staleness or contamination, or to the inexperience of
the handler, go to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 232-33, 294 S.E.2d at 893.
However, it has been argued that dog scenting evidence does not hinge upon some scien-
tific principle, but rather upon the handler's opinion and credibility; thus, the rules for ad-
mission of scientific evidence do not apply. State v. Roscoe, No. 5831, (Ariz. Dec. 28, 1984).
127. Commonwealth v. Saunders (Hanover County General Dist. Ct. Apr. 1977). The de-
fense attorney was D. Dohnal of Richmond, Virginia.
128. Dr. Tosi is a professor at Michigan State University and director of the University's
Speech & Hearing Sciences Research Laboratory and Institute of Voice Identification.
129. Mr. Lundgren was the spectrographic examiner in the case.
130. Telephone conversation with D. Dohnal, Apr. 23, 1985.
131. Id.
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the admissibility of voiceprint evidence.
Two observations about scientific evidence in Virginia may be
instructive in considering the admissibility of voice spectrography
in Virginia trial courts. First, "'scientific' evidence is nothing more
than an extension of the long-accepted principle that an expert,
having made an examination, may testify as to his opinion con-
cerning the results of his investigation. ' 132 Second, the courts and
the leading authorities on evidence have declined to endorse any
particular test for determining that a technique is "scientific. ' 133
On one hand, this could mean that, in Virginia, scientific evidence
is admitted through expert testimony, and the critical question will
be whether the witness is in fact an expert. If he is an expert, then
his testimony-his scientific evidence-is admissible. However, ex-
pert testimony will not be admitted if the results of the "scientific
testing" have not been proven to be scientifically reliable.134 What
emerges from Virginia case law, then, is a two-part analysis, more
akin to the relevancy and reliability standards employed by some
courts 135 than to the Frye rule.136 First, the witness must be quali-
fied as an expert; second, the scientific testing must be established
as reliable. If both inquiries are affirmatively established, a final
evidentiary consideration is whether the expert opinion is admissi-
ble under relevancy standards. 37
The first inquiry centers upon the witness' qualifications-his
knowledge, skill and experience; the "question of the qualifications
of a witness to speak as an expert lies largely in the discretion of
the trial court."1 38 In Virginia, no formal education is necessary;
the only requirements are that the witness have "sufficient knowl-
edge of his subject to give value to his opinion"1 39 and that he be
better qualified than the jury to form an inference from the
facts.1 40 It would appear that this rather low level of expertise
would enable most voice spectrographic examiners to qualify as ex-
132. C. FRIEND, supra note 126, § 172.
133. See generally C. FRmND, supra note 126.
134. See, e.g., Skinner v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 260, 262, 183 S.E.2d 725, 727 (1971)
(polygraph); Orange v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950) (truth serum).
135. See supra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
138. Jordan v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 591, 598, 151 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1966) (quoting
Ames & Webb, Inc. v. Commercial Laundry, 204 Va. 616, 621, 133 S.E.2d 547, 550 (1963));
see also C. FRIEND, supra note 126, § 215.
139. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Anderson, 207 Va. 567, 571, 151 S.E.2d 628, 631 (1966).
140. C. FRIEND, supra note 126, § 215.
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perts; however, the fact that a witness considers himself an expert
is not sufficient to qualify him as one. 141
Establishing the reliability of the voice spectrographic method
will be the most difficult hurdle to overcome in an attempt to ad-
mit the results of spectrographic analysis into evidence. In Orange
v. Commonwealth,42 the results of a truth serum test were not ad-
mitted because there was "no evidence with respect to the value or
the reliability of the tests.' 43 The court failed to give any guidance
as to what standards of reliability must be met for a novel scien-
tific method to be admissible as evidence.14 4 It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that at no time has the Virginia court adopted the Frye test
of admissibility. Presumably the reliability of a novel scientific
technique may be established by expert testimony.
The fact that other experts have reached different conclusions
should not render the evidence inadmissible. 45 However, it is fore-
seeable that a "battle of the experts" may occur in the effort to
establish reliability of the voice spectrographic method in Virginia.
The Virginia court appears to acknowledge the same concept as
the Massachusetts court does, that "neither infallibility nor unani-
mous acceptance of the [scientific] principle need be proved to jus-
tify its admission into evidence.' 46 The Virginia court, then, if
provided with proper experts, and upon a showing of reliability of
the method, will find that voice spectrographic evidence is admissi-
ble if it is relevant and will probably aid the trier of fact.
Counsel advocating the admission of voiceprint evidence in Vir-
ginia may point out that some courts at first declined to admit
such evidence on the theory that it had not been adequately tested
under field conditions and was therefore unreliable. At least two of
these courts have reversed their holdings or expressed a willingness
141. Id.; see also Maxwell v. McCaffrey, 219 Va. 909, 912, 252 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (1979)
("The expressed belief of a witness that he is an expert does not ipso facto require his
qualification.").
142. 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267 (1950).
143. Id. at 439, 61 S.E.2d at 274.
144. 191 Va. 423, 61 S.E.2d 267; see also Skinner, 212 Va. 260, 183 S.E.2d 725; Barber v.
Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 249-51, 142 S.E.2d 484, 490-92 (1965); Lee v. Commonwealth,
200 Va. 233, 237, 105 S.E.2d 152, 154-55 (1958). See supra text accompanying notes 99 &
100 for standards adopted by other courts.
145. Walrod v. Matthews, 210 Va. 382, 389, 171 S.E.2d 180, 185 (1969).
146. Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, -, 327 N.E.2d 671, 675 (1975); see also
Moenssens, supra note 32, at 566.
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to reconsider their earlier views, 147 particularly in light of the 1971
study conducted by Dr. Tosi.148 In admitting voiceprint evidence to
corroborate voice identification, the Florida Fourth District Court
of Appeals noted that "impressive scientific data ha[d] been
amassed as to the voiceprint's reliability" in the early 1970's.149
Finally, counsel in Virginia seeking to admit voiceprint evidence
should point out that the use of the evidence can be adequately
safeguarded. 50 As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed
out, "[u]nless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accuracy of a
particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to mislead
the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the
same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be
attacked by cross-examination and refutation."' 5 '
IV. CONCLUSION
Even now, voice spectrography may be in that "twilight zone"
referred to in Frye v. United States'52 wherein "the evidential
force of the [scientific] principle must be recognized.' 153 In time,
voice spectrography may gain the indicia of reliability which will
allow it to be admitted in courts across the country.'5 4 Only three
147. Courts in California and New Jersey now admit such evidence when they formerly
did not. Compare People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1968) and State
v. Cary, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970) (not admissible) with Hodo v. Superior Court 30
Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973) and State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644
(1972) (admissible).
Dr. Peter Ladefoged, a professor of phonetics and an authority in the field of acoustical
phonetics, was originally critical of Kersta's studies and the use of voice spectrography as a
means of speaker identification. Siegel, supra note 20, at 536. However, after reading Dr.
Tosi's 1971 study, Dr. Ladefoged professed a "new-found respect for 'voiceprint' identifica-
tion." United States v. Raymond, 337 F. Supp. 641, 644-45 n.23 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also Lykus, 367 Mass. at
- n.3, 327 N.E.2d at 676 n.3 (discussing Dr. Ladefoged's change of opinion regarding iden-
tification by the spectrographic method).
148. See Experiment in Voice Identification, supra note 43; see also Lykus, 367 Mass. at
- n.2, 327 N.E.2d at 675 n.2. See supra note 79 for a list of variables tested in the Tosi
study.
149. Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
150. See supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
151. United States v. Baler, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975).
152. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
153. Id. at 1014.
154. In a recent case, the Supreme Court of North Carolina noted that the passage of
time can serve to demonstrate the reliability of scientific phenomena "the novelty of a cho-
sen technique does not justify rejecting its admissibility into evidence." State v. Bullard, 312
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years ago, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was
violated when his attorney failed to investigate potentially excul-
patory evidence, when the evidence consisted of the defendant's
voice exemplar and the government's intercepted recording.' 5" If
its reliability is not universally accepted, at least voice spec-
trography has established itself as a force to be reckoned with in
the field of scientific evidence.
N.C. 129, -, 322 S.E.2d 370, 380 (1984) (footprint identification testimony by a physical
anthropologist admitted in a murder trial).
Nor should it be overlooked that voice spectrography has implications beyond use at trial.
Courts have allowed its use at probation revocation hearings, United States v. Sample, 378
F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974), and in probable cause hearings, State ex rel. Trimble v. Hed-
man, 291 Minn. 441, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). In Trimble, unknown to the suspect, a record-
ing was made of her voice while she discussed welfare payments. The sole purpose of the
recording was to produce a voiceprint; the voiceprint led to her arrest, and was admitted at
the probable cause hearing. Id. at -, 192 N.W. 2d at 433-34. Thus, voice spectrography has
value as an investigative aid.
155. United States v. Baynes, 687 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1982). For a further discussion of the
constitutional implications of voice spectrography, see Deckler & Handler, Voiceprint Iden-
tification Evidence-Out of the Frye Pan and Into Admissibility, 26 AM. U.L. REv. 314,
365-71 (1977) (noting that the manner in which the exemplar is procured and the identifica-
tion process itself may give rise to constitutional questions, but that due process is probably
not offended by the taking of the voiceprint or its analysis); Note, supra note 13, at 1173-74.
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